Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621 (9th Cir. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. Title VII” (citation marks and citations omitted)), with Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. Cf. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. Eleven (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) (discovering that asking a really religious employee to swear on a Bible to resolve differences with a colleague and telling her that folks did not like her “church lady act” were isolated incidents that weren’t extreme or pervasive sufficient to create a hostile work atmosphere), and Sublett v. Edgewood Universal Cabling Sys., Inc., 194 F. Supp. The Royal Commission in Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse revealed that between January 1950 and February 2015, 4,445 folks alleged incidents of baby sexual abuse in 4,765 claims. 1999) (explaining that in figuring out whether or not the alleged conduct rises to the level of severe or pervasive, a court docket should consider the factual “totality of the circumstances,” and that using a “holistic perspective is necessary, conserving in thoughts that each successive episode has its predecessors, the impression of the separate incidents could accumulate, and the work surroundings created thereby could exceed the sum of the person episodes”); see additionally, e.g., Shanoff v. Ill.
See Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 552 (7th Cir. Cf. Brown v. Polk Cnty., 61 F.3d 650, 656-57 (8th Cir. See Hall v. City of Chi., 713 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 765 (3d Cir. Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368 (1st Cir. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 693 (seventh Cir. “required degree of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct” (alteration in unique)); Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 811 (eleventh Cir. Cf. Powell v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 445 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. Cf. Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that “a routine distinction of opinion” can’t support a hostile work setting claim); Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d at 315 (4th Cir. 788; Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (sixth Cir.
6 (D. Utah Jan. 24, 2008) (“Sporadic invitations to attend church with a coworker, while uncomfortable, don’t represent a hostile work setting.”), aff’d partially and rev’d partly on other grounds, 577 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. Compare Erickson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. ”); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 563 (sixth Cir. Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1454-55 (seventh Cir. 2001) (six situations of “rather severe” harassment over four months had been adequate to permit an affordable jury to rule in favor of plaintiff). Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality . Eleven (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2011) (ruling that employee’s request for clarification of an employer “letter of counseling” instructing that his discussions of religion with coworkers “must cease” was a request for accommodation, and holding that an ongoing broad instruction not to discuss religion may very well be discovered to be an hostile action, because it left him “unable to train his religious perception and unable to discuss a topic of broad scope and of great significance to him” even when the conversation was initiated by others).
2004) (“Under Title VII, an employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to resolve a battle between an worker’s sincerely held religious perception and a situation of employment, except such an accommodation would create an undue hardship for the employer’s enterprise.”); Weathers v. FedEx Corp. 2004) (ruling that supervisor’s harassment of subordinate in violation of employer’s anti-harassment coverage was a legitimate nondiscriminatory motive for termination, even when the violations have been motivated by the supervisor’s religious beliefs). See id. (“An employer is absolutely entitled to have, for example, a no-headwear policy as an unusual matter. For instance, if a company has a policy that every one employees in its retail shops should wear shirts conveying messages celebrating LGBTQ Pride in the month of June, or that requires workers to say “Jesus is our Savior” when answering the telephone in the course of the Christmas season, the corporate may have an obligation to accommodate staff who can not convey these messages because of religious beliefs. 2006) (discovering that employer was not liable for religious harassment of plaintiff as a result of, upon studying of her complaints a few coworker’s proselytizing, the employer promptly held a gathering and told the coworker to stop discussing religion issues with plaintiff, and there was proof that the company continued to monitor the state of affairs to ensure that the coworker didn’t resume her proselytizing).